Some states have recently considered proposals that would
abolish the election of State judges and replace it with a system of appointed
judges who would face periodic retention elections. While supporters of this
plan argue that retention elections will keep judges accountable to the voters,
it is irrefutable that this plan will give judges a level of insulation from
the public they have never before experienced and make them more unaccountable
than ever before. The folly of this proposal is made clear both by history as
well as the lessons of other States that have adopted such a plan.
From a historical perspective, the Founders of our country
held succinct opinions on this issue. For example, two centuries ago when the
colonists declared themselves independent from Great Britain and had opportunity
to create their own governments, they promptly incorporated into America new
and important judicial principles - of which the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution
was typical in declaring:
All power residing originally in the people and being derived
from them, the several magistrates and officers of government vested with authority
- whether Legislative, Executive, or Judicial - are their substitutes
and agents and are at all times accountable to them.
The Framers feared tyranny
from the judiciary more than from the other two branches, so they placed deliberate
limitations on the judiciary. As a result, the Federalist Papers reported that
under their plan, "the Judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of
the three departments of power. . . . [and] the general liberty of the people
can never be endangered from that quarter."
As part of that plan, the
Framers took care to ensure that judges were accountable to the people at all
times. Although federal judges were appointed and did not face election, the
Founders made certain that federal judges would be easily
removable from office through impeachment, a procedure that today is widely
misunderstood and rarely used. While the current belief is that a judge may
be removed only for the commission of a criminal offense or the violation of
a statutory law,
it was not this way at the beginning. As Alexander Hamilton explained, "the
practice of impeachments was a bridle"
— a way to keep judges accountable to the people. And what did the Framers
believe were impeachable offenses? According to Justice Joseph Story, a "Father
of American Jurisprudence":
The offences to which the power of impeachment
has been and is ordinarily applied. . . . are what are aptly termed political
offences, growing out of personal misconduct, or gross neglect, or usurpation,
or habitual disregard of the public interests.
Under the Framers, impeachment
occurred whenever a judge attempted to carry a personal agenda through the court;
but today impeachment has become what Justice Story warned that it should never
be: a power "so weak and torpid as to be capable of lulling offenders into a
general security and indifference." The federal judiciary, because
it now enjoys a level of insulation from the people that the Framers never intended
and to which they today would vehemently object, is unafraid to reshape American
culture and policy to mirror its own political whims and personal values.
Judges given increased levels of protection from the public
feel freer to advance personal agendas, often manifesting the view expressed
by Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo who declared that:
I take judge-made law as one of the existing
realities of life.
Americans should not have to fear "judge-made laws" as a reality
of life. We elect our legislators to make our laws, and those states that elect
judges elect them to apply those laws. If these states reject a system of accountable
judges, they undoubtedly will face the same arrogance now so evident on the
federal level - as when Supreme Court Chief-Justice Charles Evans Hughes declared:
We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the
judges say it is.
Since the proclivity to reshape culture and values is so frequently
displayed by unaccountable judges, why would a state want to adopt such a system?
In fact, why would anyone even propose a system to give additional insulation
to judges? Because - proponents answer - for judges to campaign to win the votes
of citizens makes the judiciary a "political" branch and weakens the so-called
"independence" of the judiciary. Yet, as Thomas Jefferson wisely observed:
It should be remembered as an axiom of eternal truth in politics that
whatever power in any government is independent is absolute also. . . . Independence
can be trusted nowhere but with the people in mass.
And is anyone really so naivé
as to believe that the current appointed "independent" federal judiciary has
not become a political branch? As Jefferson had warned:
Our judges are as honest as other men and not more so. They have,
with others, the same passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their
corps. . . . [A]nd their power the more dangerous as they are in office for
life and not responsible, as the other functionaries are, to the elective control.
Contrary to what is asserted by the proponents of appointed
judges and retention elections, for judges to campaign and win voter support
actually prevents the judiciary from becoming a political branch because citizens
can then insist that judges confine themselves to their constitutional roles
rather than implement their own political agendas.
Another benefit of the direct elections of judges is the competition
that occurs between candidates. In contested races, judicial candidates make
public the beliefs of their opponents, thus allowing citizens the opportunity
to make informed decisions about those whom they want to sit on the bench. On
the other hand, if an individual is appointed rather than elected, his personal
beliefs might remain unknown to the public until they manifest themselves in
harmful judicial decisions. Furthermore, these appointed judges would have at
least four uninterrupted, unrestrained years before they would face voters for
the first time in a retention election - and even at that time, there would
be no opponent to remind voters of egregious decisions.
Those proposing retention elections are not improving State
government. Instead, they are violating one of its most sacred principles: they
are removing power from the people — something to which Thomas Jefferson
The exemption of the judges from that [from election] is quite dangerous
enough. I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but
the people themselves; and if we think them [the people] not enlightened enough
to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to
take it [control] from them, but to inform their discretion by education.
Jefferson further declared:
[I]t is necessary to introduce the people into every department of government.
. . . Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted
in the legislative or judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave
them out of the legislative. The execution of the laws is more important than
the making of them.
Understanding that "the execution of the laws is more important
than the making of them," many of our earliest statesmen supported the election
of State judges. For example, Noah Webster, himself a judge and the man responsible
for Article 1, Section 8, 8 of the U. S. Constitution, declared:
[M]en elected to office should be able men, men
of talents equal to their stations, men of mature age, experience and judgment;
men of firmness and impartiality. This is particularly true with regard to men
who constitute tribunals of justice - the main bulwark of our rights.
In addition to these historical lessons, recent experiences
demonstrate that in States with an appointed judiciary, judges are quite comfortable
in exerting political influence rather than simply upholding and applying State
For example, in the 2002 election, the appointed New Jersey
Supreme Court reviewed the State law declaring that a candidate's name may be
replaced on the ballot only if the "vacancy shall occur not later than the 51st
day before the general election" and somehow decided that the 35th day before
the election fulfilled the same legal requirements as the 51st day before the
election. (Recall that the Democrat candidate was lagging far behind his Republican
opponent in the polls; the Democrats convinced the unelected judges to place
a more viable candidate on the ballot - in violation of the State law - and
Democrats therefore won a U. S. Senate seat they were destined to lose.)
And who can forget the appointed Florida Supreme Court in
the 2000 presidential election? Even though State law declared that all election
vote tallies were to be submitted to the Secretary of State's office by 5 PM
on the 7th day following the election, and that results turned in past that
time were to be ignored, those judges ruled that 5 PM on the 7th day really
meant 5 PM on the 19th day, and that the word "ignored" really meant just the
opposite - that the Secretary of State must accept all
results, even those that did not comply with the law.
Judges facing regular elections would not have rendered decisions
that ignored such clear legislative language (not to mention basic math or the
common meaning of words). Elected judges know that if they make such agenda-driven
decisions, they will face a plethora of opponents in their next race who will
remind voters of their demonstrated contempt for State law.
Arrogant, elitist proposals that judges should be protected
from citizens in this day of rampant judicial political agendas is unthinkable
in our free society. History is too instructive on the necessity of direct judicial
accountability for its lessons to be ignored today. And while judicial accountability
through the use of impeachment on the federal level appears to be a thing of
the past, judicial accountability through the direct election of State judges
should not be.
Constitution or Frame of Government Agreed Upon by the Delegates of the
People of the State of Massachusetts-Bay (Boston: Benjamin Edes & Sons,
1780), p. 9, Massachusetts, 1780, Part I, Article V.
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, James Madison, The
Federalist on the New Constitution (Philadelphia:
Benjamin Warner, 1818), pp. 419-420, Federalist
#78 by Alexander Hamilton; see also
p. 398, Federalist #73 by Alexander
for example, Irving Brant, Impeachment:
Trials & Errors (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972), and also Warren S.
Grimes, who argues that impeachment is a relic of the past and should be
abandoned in his "Hundred-Ton-Gun Control: Preserving Impeachment as the
Exclusive Removal Mechanism for Federal Judges," UCLA
Law Review, June 1991, p. 1254; see also U.
S. v. Carol Bayless; 95
Cr. 533 (S.D. NY, 1996); see also the joint statement issued by current
and former chief-judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in response to widespread calls from several public officials for
the impeachment of federal judge Frank Baer, Jr., March 28, 1996; see
also Fort Worth Star Telegram, April 14, 1996, C-5, "Judicial Independence"
by David Broder, writer for The
Federalist, p. 353, Federalist #65 by Alexander Hamilton.
Joseph Story, Commentaries
on the Constitution of the United States (Boston: Hilliard, Gray and
Company, 1833), Vol. II, pp. 233-234, § 762.
Story, Vol. II, p. 218,
Benjamin Cardozo, The
Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1921), p. 10.
Charles Evans Hughes, The
Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes, David J. Danelski
and Joseph S. Tulchin, editors (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973),
p. 144, speech at Elmira on May 3, 1907.
Thomas Jefferson, Writings
of Thomas Jefferson, Albert
Ellery Bergh, editor (Washington, D. C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association,
1904), Vol. XV, pp. 213-214,
to Judge Spencer Roane on September 6, 1819.
Vol. XV, p. 277, to William Charles Jarvis on September 28, 1820.
Vol. XV, p. 278, to William Charles Jarvis on September 28, 1820.
Writings, Vol. VII, pp. 422-423, to M. L'Abbe Arnoud on July 19,
Noah Webster, A
Collection of Papers on Political, Literary, and Moral Subjects (New
York: Webster & Clark, 1843), p. 303, Chapter XV.